Pyroprocess technology has been considered as a fuel cycle option to solve the spent fuel accumulation problems in Korea. The Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon, Korea has been studying pyroprocess technology, and the conceptual design of an engineering-scale pyroprocess facility, called the Reference Engineering-scale Pyroprocess Facility, has been performed on the basis of a 10 ton heavy metal throughput per year. In this paper the concept of Reference Engineering-scale Pyroprocess Facility is introduced along with its safety requirements for the protection of facility workers, collocated workers, the off-site public, and the environment. For the identification of safety structures, systems, and components and/or administrative controls, the following activities were conducted: (1) identifying hazards associated with operations; (2) identifying potential events associated with these hazards; and (3) identifying the potential preventive and/ or mitigative controls that reduce the risk associated with these accident events. This study will be used to perform a safety evaluation for accidents involving any of the hazards identified, and to establish safety design policies and propose a more definite safety design.
Introduction
Spent fuel (SF) is an inevitable byproduct of nuclear power generation. SF is highly radioactive waste which contains uranium, transuranic elements, and fission products. The direct disposal and interim storage of SF require wide and isolated areas, and thus it is not easy to find proper sites in Korea. Therefore, the development of an effective management or recycling technology for SF is essential to enhance nonproliferation and environmental friendliness. In Korea, pyroprocess technology has been considered as a fuel cycle option to solve SF accumulation problems. Pyroprocessing is one of the key technologies used to recover actinide elements and long-lived fission products from the SF in LiCl or LiCleKCl molten salt by an electroechemical reaction. Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon, Korea has been developing a pyroprocess technology for the recycling of SFs. A hot cell facility for the demonstration of an electrolytic reduction process, named Advanced SF Conditioning Process Facility, was developed in 2005 [1,2]. PyRoprocess Integrated inactive DEmonstration facility (PRIDE) was developed in 2012. In this facility, a full pyroprocess flow can be tested and its integrated performance will be verified [3, 4] . In PRIDE, depleted uranium is used for the process, and the maximum throughput is 10 tHM (ton heavy metal) per year. As the next stage of PRIDE, Engineering-Scale Pyroprocess Facility (ESPF), having radiation shielding capability to deal with SFs and the same SF treatment capability as PRIDE, was planned by 2016 but the plan was canceled. Instead of ESPF, a conceptual design of Reference Engineering-scale Pyroprocess Facility (REPF), of which design requirement was the same as ESPF's, was performed as a reference facility to be used for development of pyroprocess technology.
Idaho National Laboratory (Idaho Falls, ID, USA) conducted a conceptual design of an Advanced Fuel Cycle Facility and accident analyses for it to support the development of advanced technologies related to safeguards and security, instrumentation, process control, and integration, and to provide data on the reliability and scale-up for full-scale separations and fuel fabrication facilities [5e8] . In addition, Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute (Ibaraki, Japan) have proposed concepts for safety systems in pyrochemical reprocessing systems and performed safety evaluations [9] .
In this paper, the concept of REPF was introduced, and a hazard evaluation was performed for identification of its safety structures, systems, and components (SSCs) and specific administrative controls (SACs).
2.
Facility overview REPF for the pyroprocess demonstration consists of: (1) processing equipment; (2) a hot cell facility and a building structure to shield and isolate the process equipment; (3) hot cell remote operation equipment for safety operation and maintenance; (4) an argon system to control the inert atmosphere of a process cell; (5) a utility supply facility; (6) material receipt and storage areas for SF; and (7) a waste treatment area and a shipping facility. The main process involves the disassembly and rod cutting of SF assemblies, chopping and decladding, voloxidation, electrolytic-reduction, electro-refining, electro-winning, salt purification and recovery, waste form fabrication, off-gas treatment, and so on. Fig. 1 shows a flow diagram of REPF.
2.1.
Design requirements REPF can process a maximum of 10 tHM/yr of pressurized water reactor (PWR) fuel. The other top-tier requirements such as the operation rate, product and waste storage facility, reference SF, facility design life, and so on, are given in Table 1 . The safety class, seismic class, and quality class of the SSCs of a nuclear facility are classified according to their functions. The safety class is a criterion that should be applied to design the SSCs for PWR plants, and the classification criteria are presented in ANSI51.1 (nuclear safety criteria for the design of stationary PWR plants). In the case of REPF, there are no SSCs considered as safety classes 1 and 2. A hot cell structure and other SSCs requiring an equivalent structural integrity with the hot cell are classified in safety class 3, which can be assigned to the SSCs of which a loss of function can cause the radiological dose limit at the site boundary to be exceeded. In Fig. 1 e Process flow diagram of Reference Engineering-scale Pyroprocess Facility. TRU, transuranic elements; U, uranium. 
REPF, all of the safety-class SSCs are considered as seismic category I, and the SSCs having the possibility to affect the loss of safety functions of seismic category I SSCs under an earthquake were considered as seismic category II SSCs. The main building structure and overhead crane in REPF can be categorized as seismic category II. Table 2 shows the main SSC classifications for REPF, developed by Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute. The hot cell structure and hot cell inlet/ outlet filter perform a safety function isolating the radioactive material, and their loss of safety function can cause the radiological dose limit at the site boundary to be exceeded, and thus were considered as the SSCs of safety class 3, seismic category I, and quality class Q. The hot cell liner, radiation shielding window, transfer lock, rear door, and feed through were also classified as the same class as the hot cell structure.
For pyroprocessing, it is necessary to develop hightemperature (650 C) molten salt technology with a stringent inert atmosphere control. In REPF, the argon system was designed to control impurities such as water vapor and oxygen, and maintain negative pressure in the argon atmosphere cell. The argon system consists of an argon supply unit, an argon gas cooling and circulation unit, and an argon gas purification unit. The argon gas purification unit has a function to maintain less than 15 ppm water vapor and 40 ppm oxygen in the cell atmosphere. The argon gas pressure release unit controls the pressure in the cell from excess overpressure of 75 mmAq and underpressure of À300 mmAq.
Facility layout
REPF is divided into a main process building and support buildings. The hot cells are contained within three stories of a large, single seven-story main process building including one basement level. The building has a length of 100 m, a width of 40 m, and a height of 48 m, including a 9 m high basement. The auxiliary buildings used to support the main process building are composed of an administration building, a fire house, a workshop building, a gas storage building, a utility building, and a health physics building, which are located around the main process building.
The first floor provides space for the process cells, operating area, service area, main entrance area, truck bay, office area, and so on, as shown in Fig. 2 . The decontamination cell, a storage room for the waste and process products, an electric room, an argon system, a service area, a utility supply system area, and so on, were arranged to be located in the first basement level. A maintenance cell, a chemical analysis laboratory, an office area, and a viewing area are provided on the third floor, and a heating, ventilation, and air conditioning room was arranged on the fourth through the sixth floors. Sectional views of the main process building are shown in Fig. 3 , where the overall layout can be seen.
Identification of potential accident scenarios
The hazard analysis is performed to identify and evaluate potential accidents, and to identify bounding accident scenarios (design basis accident scenarios) that require further quantitative development. In addition, the technical safety requirements for defense in depth and the significant safety functions performed by SSCs are established by hazard evaluation results.
The results of the hazard analysis of REPF are presented and summarized in this chapter. Hazard analysis contains a comprehensive evaluation of potential process-related hazards, natural hazards, and man-made external hazards that can affect facility workers, the off-site public, and the environment by single or multiple failures. Available consideration at this point is given to all modes of operation, including startup, shutdown, and abnormal testing or maintenance configurations, as well as the potential for equipment failure and human error to identify hazards. Hazard analysis provides a thorough qualitative evaluation of risks to the facility workers, the collocated workers, the off-site public, and the environment due to accidents involving identified hazards. This methodology is used for grouping and screening of hazards and for selecting representative accident scenarios. N u c l E n g T e c h n o l 4 7 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 9 1 5 e9 2 3 3.1.
Hazard identification
A hazard is defined as a source of danger (i.e., material, energy source, or operation) with the potential to cause illness, injury, or death to personnel or damage to an operation or the environment (without regard for the likelihood or credibility of accident scenarios or consequence mitigation) [10] . The fundamental hazards affecting REPF can be categorized into process-related hazards, natural hazards, and manmade external hazards. Among the hazards, SF, radioactive materials, toxic materials, and combustibles are included in process-related hazard materials. Hazard identification activities were conducted, and some process-related hazards and natural hazards were identified. However, manmade external events were not considered as a unique hazard in this study, and that could be dealt with after establishing security design policies.
In this study, a preliminary hazard checklist evaluation was used to identify potential facility hazards. Table 3 shows the material and energy hazard sources that have the potential to lead to an uncontrolled release of radioactive or hazardous materials from REPF. The SF cask area, active material storage area, transfer tunnel area, air cell area, argon cell area, and operating area were considered to determine the preliminary initial events. As a result of a preliminary hazard checklist evaluation for REPF, a total of 41 candidate initial events were determined.
Hazard categorization
Facility hazard categorization is necessary since the facility category provides the regulatory basis for the amount of required accident analysis and selection of safety SSCs and ACs. Determining the correct facility hazard category involves comparing the facility radioactive material content to threshold values of radioactive material, which are specified in DOE-STD-1027 [11] . Hazard category 3 nuclear facilities have the potential for localized consequences, and have sufficiently low quantities of radioactive material that no potential exists for an accidental criticality. Hazard category 2 nuclear facilities have the potential for on-site consequences, and have sufficient quantities of fissionable material to lead to an accidental criticality. Hazard category 1 nuclear facilities 
are reserved for reactor facilities having a steady-state power level greater than 20 MWt. Depletion calculations are used to determine the hazard category of REPF. Using the SCALE 6.0 code package, an ORIGEN-ARP depletion calculation for 10 tHM of PWR SF with burnup of 55,000 MWD/MTU and 10 years of cooling was performed. The depletion and decay calculations in Table 4 show that both the individual quantities of important radioactive isotopes such as Sr-90, Cs-134, Cs-137, Pu-239, and Pu-241 and the sum of the isotopes easily exceed the isotopic threshold of hazard category 2. According to this result, it is clear that REPF, which uses PWR SFs as a feeding material, should be categorized as a hazard category 2 nuclear facility. 
Hazard evaluation
A qualitative hazard evaluation was performed to select the potential hazardous events and causes at REPF. Internal events happen as a result of operator error and equipment failure during process or facility operation. An analysis of postulated accidents caused by malevolent acts is not within the scope of this study.
In this study, a hazard evaluation of REPF and associated operations was conducted using a preliminary hazard analysis (PHA) [12] . The results of the PHA serve as the basis for hazard ranking so that bounding accident scenarios can be selected. The procedure is qualitatively driven and relies on experience and engineering judgment. The procedure requires careful use of unmitigated scenario evaluation to ensure rigorous selection of safety-SSCs and ACs along with identification of defense-in-depth equipment and ACs.
The most important outcome of the hazard analysis procedure is the development of the hazard evaluation table. The hazard evaluation table provides a succinct assessment of the potential hazard events, their unmitigated frequency and consequences, as well as the physical and ACs available to reduce the event frequency and/or consequences. Examples of some events summarized in the hazard evaluation table are provided in Tables 5 and 6 .
The content of the hazard evaluation table provides a condensed summary of an accident scenario, the event initiator, the unmitigated event frequency, the unmitigated event consequences, the overall risk estimate, and a listing of design and administrative items that can prevent or mitigate the dose associated with the event. The dose evaluation guidelines (EGs), both the DOE-STD-3009 25 rem EG [10] and supplemental EGs, can be used to establish the consequence category. When the consequence category and likelihood category are selected, the resulting risk bin can be identified [12, 13] . The risk bin result determines if the event merits selection of safety SSCs or ACs.
The facility hazards presented in Table 3 may result in an uncontrolled release of radioactive or hazardous material and direct radiation exposure, and were evaluated using the PHA; preliminary bounding accidents were then selected. As a result of the PHA for the 41 candidate initial events, 10 initial events falling into hazard ranking 1 or 2 were determined as bounding initial events. Table 5 shows an example of a PHA for important initial events selected as bounding events.
Preventive and mitigative features
From the analysis in accordance with the PHA, the controls for REPF were derived, which are shown in Table 6 . Some additional features are also listed for hazard events not requiring formal derived controls. There are some events involving loss of the argon atmosphere in the argon cell that lead to pyrophoric material (e.g., uranium) fires. Pyrophoric material fires occur when air enters the argon cell through: (1) a transfer lock; (2) a passive penetration breach; or (3) a loss of confinement owing to catastrophic equipment failure or crane/electro-mechanical manipulator bridge failure and subsequent damage to an argon cell penetration, resulting in exposure of pyrophoric material to air and radioactive material release. These events are considered unlikely because it would require a massive in- N u c l E n g T e c h n o l 4 7 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 9 1 5 e9 2 3 leakage of air to cause a fire. Facility worker consequences are judged to be moderate since the pyrophoric fire will require significant time to progress, and the radioactive material will require significant time to propagate from the argon cell to the operating area. Because the results events are unacceptable, safety analysis commitments should be considered to manage the collocated worker and facility worker risk from a pyrophoric material fire in the argon cell. Four safety analysis commitments were identified: (1) transfer lock dual door airlocks; (2) ACs on transfer lock operation; (3) AC on quantity of exposed pyrophoric material inside argon cell; and (4) AC on the transfer lock leak rate. Damage and meltdown of a SF assembly is the most severe event that results in the release of radioactive materials out of the normal confinement barriers. This is considered an unlikely event. Considering about 10 tons of SF, which is the storage capacity per year, the potential consequences are judged to be high to all receptors. Therefore, considering the risk index matrix, the results are unacceptable. Controls should be considered to manage all receptors, and one control (safety-class SSC) was identified: a storage vault design to prevent meltdown of SF assemblies.
There are some events involving loss of air or argon cell shielding. These events are considered unlikely based on the design. Because of the distance, the consequences to all receptors, which are off-site public, collocated workers, facility workers, and environment, are judged to be negligible, but the facility worker consequence is judged to be moderate. Therefore, the results are unacceptable, and controls should be considered to manage the facility worker risk from loss of cell shielding events. Three controls were identified: (1) air and argon cell structure; (2) air and argon cell shielding; and (3) AC on restrictions on direct radiation exposure.
Inadvertent nuclear criticality occurring inside the argon or waste storage cell is considered unlikely based on the material configuration and limited material quantity. An inadvertent nuclear criticality can give high consequence severity to the facility workers, low to the collocated workers, and negligible to the public and the environment. Considering the risk ranking matrix, the facility worker consequence is unacceptable. Controls should be considered to manage the facility worker risk from an inadvertent nuclear criticality. Three controls were identified: (1) argon and waste storage cell shielding; (2) AC on personnel access restrictions for specific areas; and (3) AC on a mass tracking program to keep inventories below the mass limit of fissionable materials.
A chlorine gas release event was considered as a representative nonradioactive hazardous material release event. 
The chlorine gas is leaked into operating areas and a pipe break resulting in a release of chlorine is unlikely. The consequence is moderate to facility workers, negligible to collocated workers, the public, and the environment. The result is unacceptable, and safety analysis commitments should be considered to manage the facility worker risk. One control was identified: a chlorine gas evacuation system, which is activated by a chlorine gas monitoring system and alarms. A seismic event that causes enough damage to the facility structure to damage radioactive material confinements is considered unlikely and could result in the release of radioactive materials from the process hot cell. The consequence of this event is high to the facility workers, moderate to the collocated workers, and low to the public. Environmental consequences are judged to be negligible. With high and moderate consequences to the facility and collocated workers, respectively, the results are unacceptable. Controls should be considered to manage the worker risk from the evaluation basis earthquake. Four controls were identified: (1) an air and argon cell structure; (2) AC on the quantity of exposed pyrophoric material in the argon cell; (3) AC on REPF radioactive material inventory; and (4) an emergency management program.
The hazard evaluation results described in Table 6 show that REPF is designed and operated using safety SSCs and ACs that protect the off-site public, collocated workers, facility workers, and environment from the associated hazard events. Based on the estimated risks, some safety-significant SSCs and ACs were identified for the facility and the collocated workers, and one safety-class SSC was identified for protection of the off-site public. The identified SSCs for each event will be credited for preventing or mitigating the events through accident analyses in ongoing study.
Summary
The conceptual design of an engineering-scale pyroprocess facility, the REPF, developed by the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, was reviewed. A hazard evaluation for the facility was performed for identification of the safety SSCs and ACs. As results of the hazard evaluation, some safetysignificant SSCs and ACs were then identified for the facility and the collocated workers, and one safety-class SSC was identified for protection of the off-site public. This study will be used to perform a safety evaluation for accidents involving any of the hazards identified, and to establish safety design policies and propose a more definite safety design.
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